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Random dictatorship has been characterized as the only social decision
scheme that satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness when individual prefer-
ences are strict. We show that no extension of random dictatorship to weak
preferences satisfies these properties, even when significantly weakening the
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1 Introduction
One of the most celebrated results in microeconomic theory is the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975), which states that every strategyproof and
Pareto-optimal social choice function is a dictatorship. However, the theorem crucially
relies on the assumption that outcomes are deterministic. Gibbard (1977) later considered
social decision schemes, i.e., social choice functions that return lotteries over the alterna-
tives, and showed that the class of strategyproof and ex post efficient functions extends to
all random dictatorships. This class contains a unique rule that treats all agents equally:
the uniform random dictatorship, henceforth random dictatorship (RD), where an agent
is chosen uniformly at random and his favorite alternative is implemented as the social
choice. Gibbard’s notion of strategyproofness is based on stochastic dominance and pre-
scribes that no voter can obtain more utility by misrepresenting his preferences no matter
what his utility function is (as long as it is consistent with his ordinal preferences). Another
implicit assumption in Gibbard’s theorem is the anti-symmetry of individual preferences.
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Characterizations of strategyproof social decision schemes for the case when agents are
allowed to express indifference have also been explored. In the context of cardinal deci-
sion schemes, Dutta et al. (2007) characterize RD for the domain in which each agent has
a unique top choice. For arbitrary indifferences, Hylland (1980) and Nandeibam (2012)
show that the only reasonable strategyproof social decision schemes are weak random dic-
tatorships. We refer to Nandeibam (2012) for a discussion of these results. Perhaps the
best-known generalization of RD to weak preferences is random serial dictatorship (RSD)
where a permutation of agents is chosen uniformly at random and agents narrow down the
set of alternatives in that order to their most preferred alternatives among the remaining
alternatives. RSD is also ex post efficient and strategyproof with respect to stochastic
dominance. However, in contrast to RD it is not efficient with respect to stochastic domi-
nance, i.e., there might be a lottery that yields more expected utility for all agents. This
failure of efficiency was first observed by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) in the context of
random assignment. We show that this is not a weakness specific to RSD but in fact all fair
generalizations of RD violate either efficiency or strategyproofness, even when significantly
weakening the required degree of strategyproofness.1
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents with preferences over a finite set A with |A| = m.
The preferences of agent i ∈ N are represented by a complete and transitive preference
relation <i ⊆ A×A. The set of all preference relations will be denoted by R. In accordance
with conventional notation, we write ≻i for the strict part of <i, i.e., a ≻i b if a <i b
but not b <i a and ∼i for the indifference part of <i, i.e., a ∼i b if a <i b and b <i
a. We will compactly represent a preference relation as a comma-separated list with all
alternatives among which an agent is indifferent placed in a set. For example a ≻i b ∼i c
will be written as <i : a, {b, c}. A preference relation <i is strict if x ≻ y or y ≻ x for all
distinct alternatives x, y. A preference profile R = (<1, . . . ,<n) is an n-tuple containing
a preference relation <i for each agent i ∈ N . The set of all preference profiles is thus
given by Rn. By R−i we denote the preference profile obtained from R by removing the
preference relation of agent i, i.e., R−i = R \ {(i,<i)}.
Let furthermore ∆(A) denote the set of all lotteries (or probability distributions) over A
and, for a given lottery p ∈ ∆(A), p(x) denote the probability that p assigns to alternative x.
Lotteries will be written as convex combinations of alternatives, e.g., 1/2 a + 1/2 b denotes
the lottery p with p(a) = p(b) = 1/2. is the set of all alternatives to which p assigns positive
probability.
Our central object of study are social decision schemes, i.e., functions that map the
individual preferences of the agents to a lottery over alternatives. Formally, a social decision
scheme (SDS) is a function f : Rn → ∆(A). A minimal fairness condition for SDSs is
1For example, this also explains why another strategyproof extension of RD to weak preferences, the
maximal recursive rule (Aziz, 2013), violates efficiency.
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anonymity, which requires that f(R) = f(R′) for all R,R′ ∈ Rn and permutations pi : N →
N such that <′i = <pi(i) for all i ∈ N . Another fairness requirement is neutrality. For a
permutation of alternatives σ and a preference relation <i, σ(x) <
σ
i σ(y) if and only if
x <i y. Then, an SDS f is neutral if f(R)(x) = f(R
σ)(σ(x)) for all R ∈ Rn, x ∈ A, and
permutations σ : A→ A.
Two well-studied SDSs are Random Dictatorship (RD) and Random Serial Dictatorship
(RSD). RD is defined when all agents have a unique favorite alternative. This includes
the domain of strict preferences as a subclass. The lottery returned by RD is obtained
by choosing an agent uniformly at random and returning that agent’s favorite alternative.
RSD is an extension of RD to the full domain of preferences. RSD operates by first
choosing a permutation of the agents uniformly at random. Starting with the set of all
alternatives, it then asks each agent in the order of the permutation to choose his favorite
alternative(s) among the remaining alternatives. If more than one alternative remains after
taking the preferences of all agents into account, RSD uniformly randomizes over those
alternatives. Formally, we obtain the following recursive definition.
RSD(R,X) =


∑
x∈X
1
|X| x if R = ∅,
|R|∑
i=1
1
|R| RSD(R−i,max<i(X)) otherwise,
and RSD(R) = RSD(R,A). The formal definition of RD is a special case of the above
definition of RSD . In contrast to deterministic dictatorships, RSD is anonymous and is
frequently used in subdomains of social choice that are concerned with the fair assignment
of objets to agents (see, e.g., Budish et al., 2013).
3 Efficiency and Strategyproofness
In order to reason about the outcomes of SDSs, we need to make assumptions on how agents
compare lotteries. A common way to extend preferences over alternatives to preferences
over lotteries is stochastic dominance (SD). A lottery SD-dominates another if, for every
alternative x, the former is at least as likely to yield an alternative at least as good as x
as the latter. Formally,
p <SDi q iff for all x ∈ A,
∑
y : y<ix
p(y) ≥
∑
y : y<ix
q(y).
It is well-known that p <SDi q if and only if the expected utility for p is at least as large as
that for q for every von Neumann-Morgenstern function consistent with <i.
Thus, for the preference relation <i : a, b, c, we for example have that
(2/3 a+ 1/3 c) ≻SDi (1/3 a+ 1/3 b+ 1/3 c),
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while 2/3 a+ 1/3 c and b are incomparable.
In this section, we define the notions of efficiency and strategyproofness considered in this
paper. The two notions of efficiency defined below are generalizations of Pareto-optimality
in non-probabilistic social choice. An alternative is Pareto-dominated if there exists another
alternative such that all agents weakly prefer the latter to the former with a strict preference
for at least one agent. An SDS is ex post efficient if it assigns probability zero to all Pareto-
dominated alternatives (see e.g., Gibbard, 1977; Bogomolnaia et al., 2005).
Second, we define efficiency with respect to stochastic dominance. A lottery p is SD-
efficient if there is no other lottery q that is weakly SD-preferred by all agents with a
strict preference for at least one agent, i.e., q <SDi p for all i ∈ N and q ≻
SD
i p for some
i ∈ N . It is well-known that SD-efficiency is stronger than ex post efficiency. An SDS
is SD-efficient if it returns an SD-efficient lottery for every preference profile (see, e.g.,
Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001; Aziz et al., 2014, 2015).
For better illustration, consider A = {a, b, c, d} and the preference profile R =
(<1, . . . ,<4),
<1 : {a, c}, b, d <2 : {b, d}, a, c <3 : a, d, b, c <4 : b, c, a, d
Observe that no alternative is Pareto-dominated, i.e., for instance the uniform lottery
1/4 a+ 1/4 b+ 1/4 c+ 1/4 d is ex post efficient. On the other hand, the uniform lottery is not
SD-efficient as all agents strictly SD-prefer 1/2 a+ 1/2 b.
Strategyproofness prescribes that no agent can obtain a more preferred outcome by
misrepresenting his preferences. There are two notions of strategyproofness associated
with stochastic dominance; they differ in the interpretation of incomparabilities and ties.
The weak notion, which we will just call SD-strategyproofness, prescribes that no agent can
obtain an SD-preferred outcome by lying about his preferences. Formally, an SDS f is SD -
manipulable if there exist R,R′ ∈ Rn and i ∈ N such that R−i = R
′
−i and f(R
′) ≻SDi f(R).
If an SDS is not SD-manipulable, it is said to satisfy SD-strategyproofness.
However, it may also be interpreted as a successful manipulation if an agent can ob-
tain a lottery that is incomparable (according to stochastic dominance) to the lottery
he obtains by reporting his preferences truthfully, since the former yields more expected
utility than the latter for some (rather than all) consistent utility functions. Strong SD -
strategyproofness requires that reporting one’s preferences truthfully is a weakly dominant
strategy. Formally, an SDS f satisfies strong SD-strategyproofness if f(R) <SDi f(R
′) for
all R,R′ ∈ Rn and i ∈ N with R−i = R
′
−i.
It is a well known fact that RSD (and hence RD) satisfies strong SD-strategyproofness.
For the domain of strict preferences, RD is the unique anonymous and ex post efficient SDS
that satisfies strong SD -strategyproofness (Gibbard, 1977). Within this domain RD is also
SD-efficient and hence also the unique anonymous SDS that satisfies SD-efficiency and SD -
strategyproofness. More generally, it can be shown that every lottery that only randomizes
over alternatives that are uniquely top ranked by some agent is SD-efficient. However, RSD
is not SD -efficient on the full domain of preferences, which can be seen by again considering
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the example above. It turns out that RSD(R) = 5/12 a + 5/12 b + 1/12 c + 1/12 d = p. For
q = 1/2 a + 1/2 b we have q ≻SDi p for all i ∈ N . Thus RSD is not SD-efficient. In fact,
every agent is strictly better off in q no matter what his utility function is (as long as it
is consistent with his ordinal preferences). The failure of RSD to satisfy SD -efficiency has
been examined in great detail in the literature (see, e.g., Bogomolnaia et al., 2005; Manea,
2008, 2009; Che and Kojima, 2010; Budish et al., 2013; Aziz et al., 2013).
4 The Result
We are now ready to show our main result, namely, that there exists no extension of RD
to weak preferences that maintains its characteristic properties of efficiency and strate-
gyproofness.
Theorem 1. There is no anonymous, neutral, SD-efficient, and SD-strategyproof exten-
sion of random dictatorship to the full domain of preferences when m,n ≥ 4.
Proof. We first prove that there is no SDS that satisfies the required properties for n = 4
and m = 4 and then use this statement to show that there is no such SDS for any larger
number of agents and alternatives.
Without loss of generality, let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and A = {a, b, c, d} and assume for con-
tradiction that f is an SDS with the properties stated above. We will consider a sequence
of preference profiles for which we (partially) determine the lottery returned by f . For a
preference profile Rk we denote by pk the lottery returned by f , i.e., pk = f(Rk). First,
consider the following preference profile.
<
1
1 : {a, c}, {b, d} <
1
2 : {b, d}, {a, c} <
1
3 : {a, d}, b, c <
1
4 : {b, c}, a, d
Observe that <i = <
σ
pi(i) for all i ∈ N if pi = (1, 2)(3, 4) and σ = (a, b)(c, d). Hence it follows
from anonymity and neutrality that f(R1)(x) = f(R1)(σ(x)) for all x ∈ A which implies
that p1(a) = p1(b) and p1(c) = p1(d). If p1(c) = p1(d) > 0, then every agent SD -prefers
the lottery 1/2 a + 1/2 b to p1, contradicting SD-efficiency. Hence p1(c) = p1(d) = 0 and it
follows that p1 = 1/2 a+ 1/2 b.
<
2
1 : {a, c}, {b, d} <
2
2 : {b, d}, {a, c} <
2
3 : a, d, {b, c} <
2
4 : b, c, {a, d}
With the same reasoning, we get that p2 = 1/2 a+ 1/2 b.
We make another preliminary observation.
<
3
1 : a, c, {b, d} <
3
2 : {b, d}, a, c <
3
3 : a, d, {b, c} <
3
4 : {b, c}, a, d
With the permutations pi = (1, 3)(2, 4) and σ = (a)(b)(c, d) it follows from anonymity and
neutrality that p3(c) = p3(d). But no lottery with positive probability on both c and d is
5
SD-efficient for R3. Hence, p3(c) = p3(d) = 0. Assume for contradiction that p3(a) > 1/2
and consider the following preference profile.
<
4
1 : a, {b, c, d} <
4
2 : {b, d}, a, c <
4
3 : a, d, {b, c} <
4
4 : {b, c}, a, d
SD-strategyproofness implies that p4(a) > 1/2, as otherwise agent 1 can benefit from re-
porting <31 instead.
<
5
1 : a, {b, c, d} <
5
2 : {b, d}, a, c <
5
3 : a, {b, c, d} <
5
4 : {b, c}, a, d
With the same reasoning as before but applied to agent 3, we get p5(a) > 1/2. Observe that
b Pareto-dominates c and d in R5. Hence, p5(c) = p5(d) = 0 follows from SD-efficiency.
To derive a contradiction, we consider two more preference profiles.
<
6
1 : a, {b, c, d} <
6
2 : b, {a, c, d} <
6
3 : a, {b, c, d} <
6
4 : {b, c}, a, d
Observe that again p6(c) = p6(d) = 0. If p6(a) ≤ 1/2, agent 2 in R5 can benefit from
reporting <62 instead. Hence, p
6(a) > 1/2. Lastly, consider R7.
<
7
1 : a, {b, c, d} <
7
2 : b, {a, c, d} <
7
3 : a, {b, c, d} <
7
4 : b, {a, c, d}
With the same reasoning as before but applied to agent 4, p7(c) = p7(d) = 0 and p7(a) > 1/2.
However, it follows from anonymity and neutrality that p7(a) = p7(b), a contradiction.
Hence the assumption that p3(a) > 1/2 was wrong. Combined with p3(c) = 0, we get
p3(a) + p3(c) ≤ 1/2.
Now consider the preference profile R8.
<
8
1 : {a, c}, {b, d} <
8
2 : {b, d}, {a, c} <
8
3 : a, d, {b, c} <
8
4 : {b, c}, a, d
If agent 3 reports <13 instead, f returns p
1. If p8(b) + p8(c) > 1/2, then p1(≻83)
SDp8, which
contradicts SD-strategyproofness. Hence, p8(b) + p8(c) ≤ 1/2. Similarly, if agent 4 reports
<24 instead, f returns p
2. If p8(b) + p8(c) < 1/2, then p2(≻84)
SDp8, which again contradicts
SD-strategyproofness. Thus, together we have p8(b) + p8(c) = 1/2. Moreover, if p8(d) > 0
we necessarily have p2(≻84)
SDp8 given that p8(b) + p8(c) = 1/2. Hence, p8(d) = 0 and
p8(a) = 1/2.
<
9
1 : a, c, {b, d} <
9
2 : {b, d}, {a, c} <
9
3 : a, d, {b, c} <
9
4 : {b, c}, a, d
If agent 2 reports <32 instead, then f returns p
3. Assume for contradiction that p9(a) +
p9(c) > 1/2. Then p3(≻92)
SDp9, which contradictions SD-strategyproofness. Hence, p9(a)+
p9(c) ≤ 1/2. Moreover, if agent 1 reports <81, then f returns p
8. Recall that p8(a) =
1/2. If p9(a) < 1/2, then together with p9(a) + p9(c) ≤ 1/2 this implies that p8(≻91)
SDp9,
contradicting SD-strategyproofness. So we get p9(a) = 1/2. We use this insight to determine
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p8. If p8(c) > 0, then p8(≻91)
SDp9, which contradicts SD-strategyproofness. Hence, p8(c) =
0, which in turn implies that p8 = 1/2 a+ 1/2 b.
<
10
1 : {a, c}, {b, d} <
10
2 : b, {a, c}, d <
10
3 : a, d, {b, c} <
10
4 : {b, c}, a, d
Note that a Pareto-dominates d in R10, which implies that p10(d) = 0 as f is SD -efficient. If
agent 2 reports <82, then f return p
8. If p10(b) > 1/2, then p10(≻82)
SDp8, and if p10(b) < 1/2,
then p8(≻102 )
SDp10. Both cases contradict SD-strategyproofness. Hence, p10(b) = 1/2.
<
11
1 : c, a, {b, d} <
11
2 : b, {a, c}, d <
11
3 : a, d, {b, c} <
11
4 : {b, c}, a, d
Again, d is Pareto-dominated by a in R11, and hence p11(d) = 0. If agent 1 reports
<101 instead, then f returns p
10. If p11(b) < 1/2, then p11(≻101 )
SDp10, which contradicts
SD-strategyproofness. Hence, p11(b) ≥ 1/2.
<
12
1 : c, {a, b}, d <
12
2 : b, {a, c}, d <
12
3 : a, d, {b, c} <
12
4 : {b, c}, a, d
Again, d is Pareto-dominated by a in R12, and hence p12(d) = 0. Moreover, with the
permutations pi = (1, 2)(3)(4) and σ = (a)(b, c)(d) it follows from anonymity and neutrality
that p12(b) = p12(c). As p11(b) ≥ 1/2 and p12(b) = p12(c), we have that p12(b) ≤ p11(b).
If p12(c) < p11(c), then p11(≻121 )
SDp12 and, on the other hand, if p12(c) > p11(c), then
p12(≻111 )
SDp11. Both cases contradict SD-strategyproofness. So together we have p12(c) =
p11(c). Next, if p12(a) > p11(a), then agent 1 in R11 can benefit from reporting <121
instead. So in summary, p12(a) + p12(c) ≤ p11(a) + p11(c) ≤ 1/2. As p12(b) = p12(c), we
have p12 = 1/2 b+ 1/2 c.
<
13
1 : c, {a, b}, d <
13
2 : b, {a, c}, d <
13
3 : a, d, {b, c} <
13
4 : b, c, a, d
Recall that f is an extension of RD and hence, f(R13) = 1/4 a + 1/2 b + 1/4 c. But
p12(≻134 )
SDp13, i.e., agent 4 can manipulate by reporting <124 instead. This contradicts
SD-strategyproofness.
Now let |N | ≥ 4 and |A| ≥ 4 be arbitrary and assume that f is an anonymous, neutral,
SD-efficient, and SD -strategyproof SDS. We use f construct an SDS f ′ that satisfies these
properties for N ′ = {1, 2, 3, 4} and A′ = {a, b, c, d} which is a contradiction. Assume
without loss of generality that A′ ⊆ A. For every preference profile R′ on N ′ and A′,
choose some profile R on N and A such that the preferences of the first 4 agents over A′
coincide in R and R′ and these agents prefer all alternatives in A′ to all alternatives in
A \A′ and the remaining agents are indifferent between all alternatives in A. Observe that
only lotteries over A′ are SD-efficient in R. Thus f ′(R′) = f(R) is well-defined. It is easily
verified that f ′ inherits anonymity, neutrality, SD-efficiency, and SD-strategyproofness
from f which contradicts what we have shown above.
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